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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of a low bound price. To do so, a popular and
empirically proven model (Stahl (89’) [11]) is used. The model is extended to include
an exogenously given bound on prices sellers can offer, excluding prices below such
bound. The finding are rather surprising - when the bound is set sufficiently high
expected price offered (EPO) by sellers drops significantly. The result seem to be
robust in the parameters of the model, and driven by the information provided to
consumers by such legislation step: when the limitation is set at sufficiently high
levels all consumers anticipate the bound price, and searchers reject any price above
it. As a result sellers offer the bound price as a pure strategy.
1 Introduction
Despite having free markets, it is often the case that governments intervene in trade. The
most common example of such is taxation, where certain goods are taxed. This is done
despite the known results on welfare impact of such interventions. However, in some cases,
e.g. Alcohol or Tobacco products, the government sees a reason to reduce the consumption
by imposing a tax. One of the reasons behind it is noted by Cnossen and Sijbren in [5],
table 8, an impressive literature connects higher price to lower consumption of alcohol, in
coordination with common belief, and helps to reduce many of the high costs of Alcohol
consumption - over 120 bn Euros in 2003 only.
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mayr and Prof. Holzner
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Figure 1: Price of 4 pack Bavaria Lager beer from mysupermarket.co.uk
An additional new step of intervention is suggested by the Scottish government. Scotland
proposes a minimum price per alcohol unit (10 ml) of 0,40£. Meng et al. in a report by
Sheffield university [9], perform a research that concludes that such a step would increase
prices on alcohol. Clearly, in cases when this bound falls below the market price it has
little effect and it would increase prices when it falls above market price level. As shown
in Table 2.1 in Meng et al. [9], the latter happens in many cases, but not in all. Here we
investigate what happens in the interim case, when the minimum price is set at market
price level. Namely, some retailers sold products below this price, and similar products
were also sold above the limit. Clearly, the interesting case is when the average market
price is above the limitation. The prices are taken from English supermarket, however
due to the close relation between England and Scotland, and a similar step being planned
by the English government, it is a relevant example.
To emphasize, suggested minimum prices would be as follows:
• Liter of 5% beer would cost at least 2£(around 2,5e).
• A 750 ml. bottle of 15% wine - 4.5£(around 5,6e).
• Half liter of 40% Vodka - 8£(around 10e).
To add to the relevancy of the question, a product example is provided on figure 1:
4x440ml of Bavaria beer 2.8% lager beer has suggested minimum price is 1.97. On
25.10.2013, prices were varying between 1.79 and 2.99£. 1. Therefore, the suggested
limitation falls in the relevant area - some sell above and some sell below, with average
price above the limitation.
1Prices are taken from http://www.mysupermarket.co.uk
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The existing empiric literature, for example, Stockwell et al. [13] and by Meng et al. [9],
imply that introducing minimum price would increase the expected prices of the relevant
goods. However, there is one main aspect to look at. The minimum price imposed by the
Scottish legislator is not necessarily higher than the previous market price of the good, as
noted by Meng et al. [9] table 2.1. In case when the limitation is set above market price,
it is clear that prices would rise, as a result of such step. Similarly, if the minimum price
is set too low it would have no effect on pricing as there is no need for anyone to adjust
price. However, this paper wishes to investigate what happens when minimum price is
set moderately. This implies setting the minimum price at some existing market price.
The question asked here is what happens in the interim case, where a minimum price is
set at price levels which are in equilibrium support, as seen in the example at figure 1.
The model analyzed here has mixed strategy equilibrium. Therefore, it leaves a range of
prices in the relevant interval.
This paper takes a deeper look into introducing lower bounds on price, keeping positive
profit for sellers in order to keep them on the market. This is done by analyzing a
popular search model, and comparing its equilibrium to one where a lower bound price is
introduced. The model analyzed is perhaps one of the most popular search models in the
literature - the Stahl Search model, introduced by Stahl [11]. This simple model has good
tractable solution, and therefore has a wide literature. Moreover, Janssen et al. [7] find
that this model indeed predicts product pricing of many goods, and finds that pricing of
86 from the 87 tested products is in line with the Stahl Model. Additionally, Baye et al.
[2] points out that the consumer types suggested by the model are empirically profound.
Therefore, such an important model provides a good indicator for checking introduction
of lower bounds on prices.
1.1 Results Overview
At the first glance, the findings are rather surprising - when the lower bound is chosen
at a certain level, not only that prices sink, but selecting the lowest allowed price by
all sellers is equilibrium. In an example it reduces the expected price offered (EPO) by
approximately 13%! Most importantly, the minimum price minimizing the EPO depends
only on parameters of consumer side, and will not be affected by entry of additional sellers.
This would keep the lower bound fixed trough changes on the supply side. Additionally,
in the case of two sellers it would be a unique equilibrium. Moreover, informed consumers
(shoppers) are indifferent and all the benefits are to the uninformed consumers (searchers).
Comparative statics suggest that information drives the results. The higher the share of
searchers the larger is the difference to the original Stahl model equilibrium. Those receive
a credible signal on what are the prices on the market, and take it into consideration when
checking prices. Note that since the minimum price ensures positive profit for sellers, it
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is profitable for sellers to sell already at the minimum price. This would not hold if the
minimum price would be replaced with a governmental tax.
When the minimum price is set sufficiently high the structure of the equilibrium is a
pure one, at the minimum price level. This implies that the entire market has the same
minimum price, in the spirit of Bertrand competition (for more on Bertrand competition
see, for example, Baye and Morgan [3]). Minimum price at lower levels will impose a mass
point at the minimum price, and some continuous distribution with lower prices than in
the original Stahl model equilibrium. The implication is clear - as long as the minimum
price is not set sufficiently high or sufficiently low it will reduce market prices, instead of
increasing them. Moreover, pricing competition would be reduced since all sellers would
use the same pure strategy.
The reasoning behind such behavior is simple. When the limitation is set at sufficiently
high levels, but below the expected price in equilibrium, the signal is credible. Searchers
believe this limitation plays a significant role, and as a result prices would be at the bound
level or close to it. As a result, also the searchers receive a signal on what are the prices in
the economy, and expect the bound price to be offered. Thus, searchers set their reserve
price sufficiently close to the bound price. Sellers anticipating such a behavior would find
it profitable to offer the bound price purely, in order to compete for the shoppers, in a
Bertrand competition. Therefore, pure equilibrium at the bound price prevails. When the
limitation is set at lower levels this effect diminishes. Now searchers believe that sellers
are less probable to be affected by such legislation. As a result, reserve price would be set
at a higher level. From sellers’ perspective, a mass point on the bound level would be set,
with some probability mass above it, but EPO remains below the one in original Stahl
model.
As a result the expected price in the market drops when such minimum price is introduced
in a market with two or three sellers, and according to Stahl [11], also could hold for a
larger number of sellers. This is due to a conjecture from Stahl [11] that reserve price
(and thus also EPO) rises with the number of sellers. A table with an example for such
increase is provided in Stahl [11]. The logic for such increase is simple - more consumers
reduce the chance to be the cheapest seller, and therefore decrease the motivation to offer
lower prices.
This paper suggestion is clear: one should be careful when setting a minimum price, as it
can reduce prices and actually increase demand. Consider the example in figure 1. If the
legislator sets the lowest price at 1.97 £, searchers would be aware of this limitation. They
would expect the price not to be too far above the limitation. Therefore, 2.99£, offered
by Sainsbury’s would not be an acceptable price for searchers. The seller anticipating it
would need to reduce price closer to the limitation price.
The structure of the paper is as follows: First the Stahl model is introduced, and relevant
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results on it are provided. Then, minimal price is imposed on the Stahl model, followed
by results and an example where prices are lower due to such a step. Afterwards, the
specific case with two sellers is looked upon. Lastly, some additional characteristics of the
price reducing equilibrium are provided, followed by a short discussion. Larger proofs are
shifted to the appendix.
2 Stahl Model
The Stahl model, as introduced in Stahl [11] is formally described below. Notation was
adjusted to the recent literature on the Stahl model.
There are N sellers, selling an identical good. Each seller owns a single store. Production
cost is normalized to 0, and assume that seller can meet demand. Additionally, there are
consumers, each of whom wishes to buy a unit of the good, evaluating it at some high
M . The mass of consumers is normalized to 1. This implies that there are many small
consumers, each of which is strategically insignificant.
The sellers are identical, and set their price once at the first stage of the game. If the
seller mixes then the distribution is selected simultaneously, and only at a later stage the
realizations take place.
The consumers are of two types. A fraction µ of consumers are shoppers, who know where
the cheapest price is, and they buy at the cheapest store. In case of a draw they randomize
over all cheapest stores, uniformly. The rest are searchers, who sample prices. Sampling
price in the first, randomly and uniformly selected, store is free. It is shown in Janssen
et al. [8] that if it is not the case then some searchers would avoid purchase and the rest
would behave as in the original model. If observed price is satisfactory - the searcher will
buy there. However, if the price is not satisfactory - the searcher will go on to search in
additional stores sequentially, where each additional visit has a cost c. The second (or
any later) store is randomly selected from the previously unvisited stores, uniformly. The
searcher may be satisfied, or search further on. When a searcher is satisfied, she has a
perfect and free recall. This implies she will buy the item at the cheapest store she had
encountered, randomizing uniformly in case of a draw. The searchers have an endogenous
reserve price, PM , which determines when they are satisfied.
The consumers need to be at both types (namely, 0 < µ < 1). If there are only shoppers
- it is the Bertrand competition setting, (see Baye and Morgan [3]), and if there are only
searchers the Diamond Paradox (Diamond [6]) is encountered, both well studied.
Before going on, make a technical assumption on the model. In order to avoid measure
theory problems it is assumed that mixing is possible by setting mass points or by selecting
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distribution over full measure dense subsets of intervals. This limitation allows all of the
commonly used distributions and finite combinations between such.
Additionally, a couple of very basic results are introduced:
• Sellers cannot offer a price above some finite bound M . This has the interpretation
of being the maximal valuation of a consumer for the good.
• Searchers accept any price below c. The logic behind it is any price below my further
search cost will be accepted, as it is not possible to reduce the cost by searching
further.
2.1 Game Structure
The game is played between the sellers, searchers and the shoppers. The time line of the
game is as follows:
At the first stage, sellers set their pricing strategies and simultaneously searchers set their
common reserve price. Then, if some sellers used a mixed strategy, realization of mixed
strategies is taking place. At the second stage shoppers observe all the realized prices
and purchase item at the cheapest store. At the third stage, searchers sample a price
randomly (uniformly) selected. If a searcher is satisfied she purchases the item. If not -
she pays c and observes another price, and so forth until ether she is satisfied or sampled
all prices. When the searcher observed all stores and observed only unsatisfactory prices
she would buy at the cheapest store encountered.
When reserve price and pricing strategies are being determined the knowledge of the
various agents of the game is as follows:
• Sellers have beliefs regarding the reserve price set by searchers
• Searchers have beliefs about which pricing strategies were actually played by the
sellers.
• Shoppers will know the real price in each store in the moment it is realized.
The probability that seller i sells to shoppers when offering price p is denoted αi(p). Let
q denote the expected quantity that seller i sells when offering price p. The expected
quantity sold by a seller consists of the expected share of searchers that will purchase at
her store, plus the probability she is the cheapest store multiplied by fraction of shoppers
(µ), and is also the expected market share of the seller.
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Note that the reserve price ensures that the searcher will purchase at the last visited store,
unless all stores were searched.
2.2 Utilities and Equilibrium
As the sellers set their price at the start of the game, they examine the expected utility that
would be obtained due to their pricing strategy. Searcher decision whether to purchase
the item or search further is taken on the later step of the game, when exact utility
is available. Therefore, sellers have an ex ante expected utility, whereas searchers and
shoppers have ex post utility, as follows:
• Seller utility is price charged multiplied by expected quantity sold.
• Consumer utility is a large constant M , from which item price and search costs are
subtracted.
The NE of the game has a Bayesian structure, and is as follows:
• Searchers have a reserve price (PM).
• Searchers beliefs coincide with seller strategies played.
• Seller have beliefs regarding the reserve price which coincide with PM .
• Reserve price is rational for the searchers
• No seller can unilaterally adjust the pricing strategy and gain profit in expected
terms.
Remark 2.1 As the sum of the searcher and seller utilities may differ only in the search
cost, any strategy profile where all searchers always purchase the item at the first store
visited is socially optimal.
The original article also pins down the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model:
Theorem 1 Stahl, (89’) [11]
In the model described above exists a unique symmetric NE, where all sellers use a con-
tinuous distribution function F on the support between some PL and PM , which is the
reserve price.
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An additional important result involves the equilibrium price distribution. Since a seller
is indifferent between all strategies in support when mixing she must have equal profit for
all prices she offers. Thus in the original model equilibrium the profit equality implies:
P
(
(1− F (p)n−1)µ+ 1− µ
n
)
= PM
1− µ
n
From here follows that:
F = 1− n−1
√
1− µ
nµ
(
PM
P
− 1) (1)
Since F (PL) = 0 we get that:
1− µ
nµ
(
PM
PL
− 1) = 1
Which in turn implies that:
PL = PM
1 + (n− 1)µ
1− µ
An additional connection exists between the reserve price PM and the distribution F :
Lemma 2.1 In a seller symmetric equilibrium the reserve price is exactly c above the
expected price of F .
Proof:
Firstly note that in a symmetric equilibrium observed price does not reveal any additional
information about prices in other stores. Therefore, the decision whether to search further
or not depend only on the believed expected price of sellers. If this expected price is
sufficiently lower than observed prices - search will go on. If not - the searcher would be
satisfied. Most of the search literature remains in the symmetric world, and therefore, we
look on symmetric equilibria.
If PM − E(F ) would be above c - searchers would not be satisfied with price offers of
PM , and search further. If it would be below c - searchers would be better off accepting
prices up to E(F ) + c. Since sellers know this, they would offer E(F ) + c and expect the
searchers to accept such price. The claim of searchers to reject prices below E(F ) + c is
not credible. 2
One can be surprised regarding such equilibrium structure, and mixed seller strategies.
The economic intuition behind it is quite simple. Low prices have high probability to
attract shoppers, and will have a higher market share. Higher price is attractive to
extract information rent from searchers. In equilibrium these two motivations have equal
weight, and therefore a mixed equilibrium prevails.
8
3 Minimum Price
Up to here we were discussing the original Stahl model with its known results. Now we
wish to introduce a price limitation in the model. Consider a legislator, who wishes to
introduce a minimum price, below which sales are forbidden. For that let us consider the
implications of such a step in the Stahl search model.
Let us denote the Stahl model with a minimum price limitation as the limited model.
Additionally, fix c, µ and N . Let us reserve to PM as the reserve price in the corresponding
original Stahl model equilibrium, and F the equilibrium distribution.
Definition 3.1 Let us define the price P ∗ as follows:
P ∗ = c
1− µ
µ
Theorem 2 Consider the Stahl model with the parameters N, c and µ. Let PC be a price
weakly above P ∗. Suppose that a minimum price of PC is imposed. In the limited model
exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium, where all sellers select PC purely, and PC + c is
the searcher reserve price.
Proof shifted to the appendix.
Remark 3.1 Note that any equilibrium where PC > PL must have mass points at PC.
The reason is simple - without mass points at PC there is no motivation to go below this
price, as it already attracts shoppers with certainty. Therefore, such equilibrium would
prevail also without a cutoff price. However, we know that such equilibrium must have PL
in support which is not possible.
This theorem provides the first important result. If the minimum price is set suffi-
ciently high we will receive a pure equilibrium where all sellers select reserve price purely.
Searchers treat such a signal as important for the market and anticipate that prices should
be around the minimum price. Sellers anticipating it, and therefore do not offer prices
higher than PC + c. However, the share of shoppers is sufficiently high to make PC more
attractive than PC + c, making a pure equilibrium. This is since at PC also shoppers
would purchase the item in my store, and at PC + c only searchers originally visiting my
store would buy there.
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3.1 Lower Prices
An important question is whether price offers are higher or lower due to this limitation.
This question is dealt with next.
Definition 3.2 Let us denote the ratio between the expected price offered (EPO) in the
original model and P ∗ as β. If β > 1 the expected price offered in the limited model is
lower than in the original model.
The following lemma suggests a condition which ensures that the expected price offered
in the limited model.
Lemma 3.1 The expected price offered in the limited model with minimum price of P ∗
is lower than the one in the original model iff PM > c/µ.
Proof:
Note that the expected price offered in the original model is given by PM − c, and P ∗ =
c1−µ
µ
. Therefore:
β =
µ(PM − c)
c(1− µ)
The expression is larger than one iff:
µ(PM − c) > c(1− µ)
after simplifying we obtain the required condition. 2
Note that this condition involves an endogenous parameter PM . When it could be ex-
plicitly found, a different, exogenous condition could be provided. However, this is a
condition which may be true or false, depending on the parameters of the model. As
noted by Stahl in [11], there is a monotone connection between PM and µ. Lower µ (less
shoppers) imposes higher reserve price, as the motivation to attract shoppers decrease.
As a conclusion, if in an equilibrium of the original Stahl Model it is the case that
PM(N,µ, c) > c/µ then it is possible to reduce the payment of searchers by introduc-
ing a minimum price of P ∗. Searchers sample a store randomly, and in expected terms
will observe the expected price sellers offer. Therefore, searchers benefit from such a step.
Note that if this condition does not hold, the reserve price is rather low in comparison to
P ∗, as P ∗ would be above PM − c. Only then any price limitation which can be possible
would not reduce EPO. Therefore, initially the information rent was rather low.
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Below a numeric example with 2 sellers is provided. It is suggested in Table 1 in Stahl
[11] that the reserve price increases with N . Therefore, the case with 2 sellers probably
has the lowest reserve price. The reason behind such a motivation is simple - when more
sellers are in competition, it is harder to be the cheapest seller decreases. Therefore, there
is less motivation to offer discounts, which drive the prices up.
3.2 Example
Example 3.1 Consider the Stahl model with 2 sellers, search costs of c and µ = 1/3.
In the example µ = 1/3, such that (1−µ)/N = µ. Original model equilibrium distribution
is F (p) = 2 − PM/P and PL = PM/2. The expected price of a seller would be then
E = PM(ln2). Since E + c = PM we get that c = PM(1− ln(2)) ≈ 0.3PM .
Comparing the expected price offered and c(1−µ)/µ = 2c we get that such an equilibrium
would be more profitable for searchers, as prices offered in the equilibrium with minimum
price set at c(1− µ)/µ are lower than E.
Applying the definition of β it is visible that expected price offered is about 13% less than
in the original model equilibrium:
β =
PM − c
c(1−µ
µ
)
+
PM ln(2)
2PM(1− ln(2) ≈
69
61
≈ 1.13
Therefore, in this case the condition holds and the expected price offered is indeed lower,
and is lower by about 13%.
4 Two Sellers
In the case of two sellers it is possible to provide some additional results. The main
reason behind it is the ability to calculate the expected value of original model equilibrium
distribution F . Remember from equation (1), that in the general case it is:
F = 1− n−1
√
1− µ
nµ
(
PM
P
− 1)
And there is no general explicit expression for the expected value of F . However, in the
case of two sellers, F looks as follows:
F = 1− 1− µ
2µ
(
PM
P
− 1)
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In such case the expected value is given by:
PM
1− µ
2µ
ln
(
1 + µ
1− µ
)
Let us denote ln 1+µ
1−µ as κ.
Since E(F ) + c = PM , we can obtain a value for the reserve price:
PM = c
2µ
2µ− (1− µ)κ (2)
From here it is possible to obtain several additional results. Firstly, a lemma shows that
for any two seller Stahl model introducing a low price bound would reduce prices.
Lemma 4.1 The condition from lemma 3.1 holds for the case of two sellers.
Proof shifted to appendix.
Remark 4.1 Stahl [11] argues in table (1) that increasing the number of sellers increases
the reserve price (for fixed µ, c). If this is true, then introducing P ∗ will have the positive
implication for searchers, and the pure equilibrium will hold.
Proposition 4.1 Consider a two seller Stahl model, with a limitation is imposed at price
P ∗. In such case the equilibrium, as shown in theorem 2 is unique, and no additional
mixed or asymmetric equilibria exist.
Proof of proposition is shifted to the appendix.
A very important question is whether shoppers benefit or not from such equilibrium. The
surprising answer is that when the lowest possible they are indifferent when P ∗ is selected.
Lemma 4.2 Let N = 2. Suppose sellers mix independently. Then the expected offer the
shoppers observe in orig. equilibrium is exactly equal to P ∗.
Proof:
This follows directly from the expected value of minimum value from two iid variables
with the distribution F = 1 − 1−µ
2µ
(PM
P
− 1). Remember that min(F1, F2) is distributed
with 1− (1− F )2.
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Then, the expected price shoppers’ encounter is given by the distribution:
G(p) = 1− (1− µ
2µ
Pm
p
− 1)2 (3)
The expected value of such a distribution is:
E(G) = 2(
1− µ
2µ
)2PM(
2µ
1− µ − log(
1 + µ
1− µ)) (4)
Setting the value of PM from equation (2) into the last equation leads to E(G) = cµ/(1−
µ). 2
The two seller case allows us to perform some additional analysis. When PC < P
∗ we
have equilibria of a different form, as given by corollary A.2. There, sellers set a mass
point with mass ρ(PC) on the minimum price PC , and a continuous distribution over a
parameter and PC dependent interval (PN , PM) where PN is strictly larger than PC . An
important result for comparative statics is below, explaining how does the reserve price
(and thus also the expected price offered which is c below PM) change:
Lemma 4.3 In such equilibria PM is decreasing in ρ.
Proof shifted to the appendix.
Thus, increasing PC between PL up to P
∗ increases ρ and slowly decreases the EPO, up
to a level where it reaches the lowest value at P ∗. Higher values keep the pure equilibrium
but with a higher EPO, as sketched in figure 4.1.
Corollary 4.1 Consider the Stahl model with two sellers. For any minimum price in the
interval (PL, PM −C), the resulting EPO would be lower than in the original equilibrium.
Following corollary A.3, larger mass point at minimum price implies minimum price closer
to P ∗. Since it is strictly monotone, the equilibrium would be unique. Note that there will
be no jump at PL, due to the continuous nature of the change from the original equilibrium
when ρ is small. Now, it is possible to sketch equilibrium behavior as a function of the
minimum price, as done in figure 2 for the case of two sellers. Note that the slope between
PL and P
∗ can be of a different nature, as it is only a sketch.
4.1 Two Sellers Summary
So, for two sellers some strong results are available. Firstly, when limitation is set at P ∗,
it is always a good idea to introduce a minimum price if consumers benefit is before the
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Figure 2: change in EPO as func. of minimum price(2 sellers)
eyes of the decision maker. The resulting equilibrium is unique. If one is concerned about
the shoppers - those are indifferent between the two possibilities and therefore, in total
consumers are better off.
Additionally, no matter where the minimum price is set, EPO would drop. It is not only
the specifically picked P ∗, but any price in the range (PL, PM − c) that have such an
effect. The effect is global over the entire range of prices. Any level of minimum price
below original EPO where it is not possible to use the original equilibrium will not increase
market prices. Clearly, it is maximized at P ∗, and is lower the further we are from it,
but it still prevails. When the limitation is set above P ∗ we will have a pure Bertrand
equilibrium, where all sellers set the limitation price. When the limitation is at p, where
p < P ∗, then there would be a mass point at p with some additional distribution mass
between two prices strictly above p and below original model reserve price.
5 More than two sellers
When more than two sellers are involved, the picture starts to be more complex. Firstly,
asymmetric equilibria are possible, as noted by Astone-Figari and Yankelevitch [1]. The
comparison so far was on symmetric equilibria, and additional ones can be completely
different than the ones introduced before.
However, even in the symmetric equilibrium difficulties arise. An additional complexity
rises when one tries to calculate the expected value of the original model price distribution.
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Remember that from equation (1):
F = 1− n−1
√
1− µ
nµ
(
PM
P
− 1)
Unfortunately, there is no general explicit expression for the expected value of F , which
would cover all possible number of sellers. Therefore, most of the results cannot be proven
for a general number of sellers.
5.1 Three Sellers
It is possible to calculate explicitly the expected value denoted in equation (1) when the
number of sellers is three.
Using Matlab and calculating the reserve price PM for the case of 3 sellers, the following
expression was obtained:
E(F )
PM
= arctan
(√
3µ
1− µ
)
·
√
1− µ
3µ
Note that E(F ) = PM − C, and from here follows:
PM =
c
1− E(F )
PM
=
c
1− arctan
(√
3µ
1−µ
)
·
√
1−µ
3µ
As we have found, in two sellers case the reserve price was given by:
c = PM(1− 1− µ
2µ
ln
1 + µ
1− µ)
Figure 3 states the difference between reserve prices for a given µ with 2 and 3 sellers
is provided below. It clearly shows that the reserve price for 3 sellers is higher for any
µ ∈ (0, 1). Additionally, lower µ increases the difference in reserve price. From here
follows:
Lemma 5.1 For the case of 3 sellers imposing a lower bound on price at the level of P ∗
would reduce the expected price offered. The percentage prices drop by slightly more than
what was with 2 sellers.
Fix µ ∈ (0, 1) and c. Let P2 be the reserve price in the corresponding original Stahl model
with 2 sellers, and P3 with three sellers. Then, P3 > P2. This fact is immediate from
figure 3.
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Note that since P ∗ is independent in the number of sellers and expected price offered is
PM − c, higher PM implies more beneficial equilibrium for searchers.
Corollary 5.1 The condition from lemma (3.1) holds also for three sellers.
Since the condition is PM > c/µ, if it holds for P2, it would also hold for P3. This is in
line with Table 1 in Stahl [11], suggesting that reserve price is rising with the number of
sellers.
An additional result available for three sellers is shoppers’ indifference:
Lemma 5.2 Consider the original three seller Stahl model. Shoppers expected price is
exactly P ∗.
Similar to the two seller case, applying the expected value of minimum of three F distr.
variables would yield the result.
Remember that P ∗ = c(1− µ)/µ. Thus, we can calculate:
P ∗ = PM(1− arctan
(√
3µ
1− µ
)
)
Additionally, the distribution of shoppers price is given by 1− (1− F )3. Calculating the
expected value would yield P ∗. 2
Remark 5.1 One can repeat the exercise with any desired number of sellers (n) and a
desired share of shoppers (µ). Then, a numeric calculation, or, perhaps, in some cases
even an analytic expression, for the expected value of F can be found. Then it is possible
to calculate PM and verify whether it is above P
∗ + c.
6 Discussion
A very important question is on the intuition for such a result. A hint can be provided
from µ comparative static. As Figure 4 suggests, the lower the share of shoppers, the
higher is the effect of introducing such a bound. Additionally, if the price limitation is
set above P ∗, based on theorem 2 - the pure equilibrium would still exist and is unique.
Therefore, no additional gain for consumers can be obtained.
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Figure 3: PM with 3 sellers minus PM with 2 sellers as func. of µ, in c units
Note that if the limitation is set at P ∗ the information gain of shoppers is exactly zero.
They do not get better offers due to their knowledge, but get the same offer as all con-
sumers. Moreover, they get the same offer as before (in expected terms). Therefore,
a possible explanation to this phenomenon is information. The law provides additional
information to searchers regarding what is cheap and what is not. Using this information
searchers form more informed beliefs and get a better deal when purchasing the item.
Additionally, the signal needs to be sufficiently credible. If the bound is set too low, no
consumer would believe that sellers would go THAT low on pricing. For example, a low
bound set below the support of the original Stahl model would probably have zero effect
on results, as all sellers would keep on playing the original model equilibrium. Therefore,
this bound needs to be set sufficiently high in order to be credible.
As a result searchers set their reserve price sufficiently close to the bound price. Sellers
anticipate it, and since no seller wishes to be above the reserve price, the price dispersion
is lower. Additionally, since there is a motivation to attract shoppers and be cheapest, a
seller would compare the prices scope available to her. If other sellers have sufficient mass
at the bound price, she would not want to deviate from it too. Since the information rent
from searchers is low, due to their lower reserve price, it is more attractive to compete for
the shoppers.
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Figure 4: PM − P ∗ in c units as func. of µ (2 sellers)
Therefore, as an outcome we receive the pure equilibrium.
When the bound price is set at a lower level, this effect diminishes and there are mass
points at PC . The mass on PC decreases with the bound. Still, the expected price and
reserve price are below the original model equilibrium.
6.1 Model Relevancy
The following characteristics are important for the model and results:
• Homogeneous goods with same production costs
• Fixed demand which does not depend on the price
• Information asymmetries among consumers
• Small number of big players
• Large price dispersion
• Reserve price is above c/µ.
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The first three characteristics are basic for the Stahl model. Firstly, in the Stahl model
all consumers end up purchasing the good, no matter the prices. This could reflect a
market of essential goods, such as electricity supply, bank account, or as seen by many,
cellphone and Internet connection. One may argue that Alcohol is not best described, but
as found by Jannsen et al. in [7], the Stahl model is significant also for other markets.
Additionally, the Stahl model involves a homogeneous good and some asymmetry among
consumers. The next point is due to certain results in case of several sellers. This can
motivate a covert step to reduce profits in an oligopolistic market. If the market does
not have big players or no big ability to fight politicians, then a more harsh approach can
be used, as severe taxation. If there are big players with policy influence, then perhaps
such a step can be used to reduce their revenue. The next point elaborates on the price
reduction. Large price dispersion implies large information rents which would be absent
in the pure equilibrium, and imposes also the last, endogenous point.
The last point is a condition for the new equilibrium to reduce prices, as seem in lemma
3.1. Unfortunately, it is not possible to give a general analytic expression to PM , and
therefore it involves this endogenous parameter. If this condition does not hold then the
lowest possible price reduction is too close to the original model reserve price. Therefore,
it is not possible to benefit consumers. However, as shown in lemmas 4.1 and 5.1 it holds
for two and three sellers. Note that it may also generally hold, as table 1 in Stahl [11]
suggests that the reserve price increases with N . If it is indeed the case, then the condition
depicted in lemma 3.1 will hold for any number of sellers, with similar logic to the one
presented in lemma 5.1.
The strongest result is presented in lemma 4.1. The effect is prevailing over an interval of
prices. Moreover, it is the maximal possible interval, since minimum price below PL allow
original equilibrium and prices above PM − C only allow prices above EPO. Therefore,
setting a minimum price at a market price level has an opposite effect to a possible original
intuition.
7 Summary
This paper studies the impact of a lower bound on the price. If such lower bound is
introduced, it may possible to reduce price significantly, and the equilibrium would be
unique. Clearly, when the price limitation is set below the lowest price on equilibrium
it would have no effect, and when it is set above the expected price in equilibrium the
prices would be higher. In the intermediate cases the effect is rather surprising at first
sight. In the case with 2 sellers, for the entire interval the expected price in equilibrium
with minimum price is lower. Thus, when the lowest allowed price set at any relevant
price level, expected price offered by sellers gets significantly lower. Still, all sellers have
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a certain positive, though lower, profit. Therefore, it is not expected that due to such
change sellers will go bankrupt. The lowest EPO is obtained when the limitation is set
at the level of P ∗, and it reduces prices for the case of 2 sellers, and, judging by Table 1
in Stahl [11] probably also with a general number of sellers.
The price reduction is increasing in the amount of searchers, suggesting that the reason
driving the result is providing searchers with valuable information. This helps consumers
to define what is cheap, and what can be expected, due to such clear legislation. The
fact that at the level price P ∗ shoppers get the same offer (in expected terms) strengthens
this intuition. Lastly, when price limit is set above the critical level of the pure NE, the
pure equilibrium still prevails, but with a higher price offered by sellers one to one. Thus,
when the information rent is zero, increasing the limiting price has only negative effect
on consumers, due to a ban on lower prices.
If the original Stahl model equilibrium uses prices between PL and PM (with EPO at
PM − c), then, in the case of two sellers setting the minimum price at levels between PL
and PM − c prices would drop. The drop in prices would be maximized at P ∗ = c1−µµ . On
both sides of P ∗ it changes continuously. Therefore, one must be careful when setting a
minimum price, as it may have an effect opposite to the intention of the legislator. If the
limitation is set weakly above P ∗ the resulting equilibrium would be a pure one, when all
sellers set their price at the limitation price. When the limitation is set lower, sellers share
a mixed strategy: PC would have a mass point, and a distribution between two prices
strictly above PC . However, EPO still remains below the level of the original equilibrium.
Additional effect of introducing a low bound price is limiting predatory pricing, for exam-
ple see Snider [10] and Bolton and Scharfstein [4]. This would allow additional players to
enter the market on the seller side increasing competition. In the real world many markets
are oligopolistic and deter new entry, which would not be possible once low bound prices
are introduced. This will impose an additional positive impact on many markets, and
make them far less oligopolistic. This could add an additional discount in pricing, due to
higher number of entrants, which fall beyond the scope of this paper.
7.1 Future Research
This paper is, to the author’s knowledge, one of the first papers suggesting that imposing
a minimum price would reduce prices. Opening a new door often adds many questions
and new directions. Some of them are introduced below.
A natural next step is taking these results to the lab, or the real world. Empirically
compare offered prices in the original and price limited cases and verify the results here.
Then it would be politically possible to offer such measures also in the real world, as today
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no policy maker would consider such step as price reducing.
Additional theoretic steps that provide interest include comparative statics. How changes
in µ and N affect the results, and price reduction in the most general case. The results
here suggest larger benefit when µ is lower for 2 or 3 sellers, as does shifting from 2 to
3 sellers. General result for any number of sellers would be very useful, yet the general
expression may be not analytic. An additional robustness check would be to look at
possible asymmetric equilibria of the model, and verify whether in all of them price would
be reduced.
An additional important step, is checking the case of heterogeneous searchers, in a model
similar to Stahl [12], or heterogeneous sellers, in a similar model to Astorne-Figari and
Yankelevich [1]. One can examine a completely different search model, for example the
one from Varian [14], and verify whether such bounds reduce prices there.
A Omitted Proofs
We begin with the proof for theorem 2.
Theorem 3 If prices below P ∗ are forbidden, exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium
(yet possibly some additional mixed ones), where all sellers select P ∗ purely, and P ∗ + c
is the reserve price.
Proof:
The main point in proving the theorem is to show that no seller can deviate. Beforehand
note that reserve price of P ∗ + c is rational, as the expected seller price in equilibrium is
P ∗. Therefore, if a seller offers above P ∗ + c it is worthy to search on and encounter P ∗
at the next store. If offered below P ∗ + c then an additional search is not worthy.
The profit for a seller in equilibrium is as follows:
pi(P ∗) = P ∗/N
Sellers cannot deviate to a lower price. If a seller deviates to a higher price then there are
two possibilities:
• If the price is weakly below P ∗+ c then the seller will sell only to searchers initially
visiting her store
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• If the price is above P ∗ + c then nobody will purchase at the store.
In the latter case the profit is zero, and in the former case the profit is maximized when
the price offered is exactly P ∗ + c. The profit when offering P ∗ + c is:
pi(P ∗ + c) = (P ∗ + c)(1− µ)/N
Therefore, the deviation is not profitable iff pi(P ∗) ≥ pi(P ∗ + c), which implies:
P ∗/N ≥ (P ∗ + c)(1− µ)/N
P ∗ ≥ (P ∗ + c)(1− µ)
P ∗µ ≥ c(1− µ)
P ∗ ≥ c1− µ
µ
The last inequality holds due to the definition of P ∗. Therefore, any minimum price
weakly above P ∗ will also work.
Note that any price other than P ∗ cannot have positive mass in equilibrium strategy
distribution. This is due to undercutting.
2
Next the proof for lemma 4.1 is provided.
Lemma A.1 The condition from lemma 3.1 holds for the case of two sellers.
Proof:
From equation 2, it follows that:
f(p) = 1−µ
2µ
PM
P 2
E(F (P )) = PM − c = 1−µ2µ κPM
c = PM(1− 1−µ2µ κ)
The required condition is µPM > c. This will hold iff:
2µ− (1− µ)κ
2µ
< µ (5)
Elaborating the expression yields:
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2µ− (1− µ)κ
2µ
< µ
2µ− (1− µ)κ < 2µ2
2µ− 2µ2 < (1− µ)κ
This is equivalent to: κ > 2µ. Note that both expressions are 0 when µ = 0 and both
expressions are increasing in µ when µ ∈ (0, 1). Comparing the derivatives one sees that:
κ′ =
1
1 + µ
+
1
1− µ =
2
1− µ2 > 2 = (2µ)
′∀µ ∈ (0, 1) (6)
Thus κ raises more steep than 2µ. Since equality is obtained at 0, it follows that in the
range κ > 2µ.
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Lastly, the proof for proposition 4.1 is provided:
Proposition A.1 Consider a two seller Stahl model. Suppose a limitation is imposed at
price P ∗. Then the equilibrium, as shown in theorem 2 is unique, and no additional mixed
or asymmetric equilibria exist.
Proof:
Note that the only additional equilibria where a ban on low prices plays a role are ones
where sellers set mass points on the price P ∗. Let the mass on the price P ∗ be denoted
ρ. Additionally, as before no seller would offer a price above the reserve price.
The profit of a seller offering the price of P ∗ would be:
• If the other seller sets price P ∗ - profit of P ∗/2
• In any other case profit of P ∗(µ+ (1− µ)/2).
Note that due to undercutting at no price except P ∗ would be a mass point. Additionally,
the reserve price would be the highest price in seller strategy support.
From here follows that seller strategy must be an isolated point at P ∗, and then an interval
from some PN up to PM . This is since at PN , the next offered price above P
∗ the profit
is:
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• If the other seller sets price P ∗ - profit of PN(1− µ))/2
• In any other case profit of PN(µ+ (1− µ)/2).
Since (1− µ)/2 < 1/2, we get that PN > P ∗ + ε for some positive ε.
From equal profit when mixing one can get the distribution for the interval (PN , PM):
F (P ) = 1− 1− µ
2µ
(
PM
P
− 1)
Let us denote the mass at PL as ρ. From here, F (PN) = ρ, the ratio of PN and PM is as
follows:
PM
PN
=
1 + µ− 2µρ
1− µ .
Combining continuous distribution with mass point, yields the expected value as follows:
E(F ) = ρP ∗ +
1− µ
2µ
log
PM
PN
(7)
Remember that E(F ) = PM − c and P ∗ = c1−µµ . Thus, once can replace c and P ∗ with
PM multiplied by corresponding elements. Note that:
PM(1− µ)/2 = P ∗(1− ρ/2)µ+ (1− µ/2)
PM = P
∗1 + µ− µρ
1− µ
PM = c
PM
P ∗
P ∗
c
Replacing P ∗ and c with fractions of PM would cause PM to be narrowed down throughout
the expression, leaving the equality E(F ) = PM − c as follows:
1− µ
2µ
(log(1 + µ− 2µρ)− log(1−mu)) = 1− ρ
1 + µ− µρ (8)
This equation does not have a solution for µ, ρ ∈ (0, 1). For the value of the expression
depicted at equation (8) (left side minus right side) see Figure 5.
2
and the corresponding corollary:
Corollary A.1 If lowest price bound set at a level above P ∗ the pure NE would be unique.
The main change is that the ratio between the used P ∗ and c would be higher. This would
increase the right hand side on equation 8, and it would remain without a solution. This
is visible via the logarithm expression than needs now to be even larger than for the P ∗
minimum price.
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Figure 5: The difference between LHS and RHS of eq. 8.
Corollary A.2 In the case that PC < P
∗ additional equilibria are possible. For each
price for PC ∈ (PL, P ∗) exists an equilibrium where sellers have a mass point on PC, and
then a continuous distribution over an interval (PN , PM) where PM is the reserve price
and PN is a price strictly larger than PC.
When going to the other direction and subtracting form the right hand side the equation
8 would have a solution, implying an equilibrium of the given form. An additional insight
is important:
Corollary A.3 The larger the ρ satisfying the equation the closer is the minimum price
to P ∗.
Follows directly from the fact that the expression is decreasing as ρ goes further from 1.
The last lemma to be proven is 4.3: We have shown that in equilibria when PC is set
below P ∗, PC has a mass point of ρ. Note that lower PC implies lower ρ.
Lemma A.2 PM is decreasing in ρ. That is, higher ρ implies lower PM .
Proof:
In equation 7 from the appendix the expression for the expected price offered is calculated
as a function of PM , µ and ρ. Suppose for the moment that PM remains constant. Then,
the derivative over ρ is depicted in figure 6.
From figure 6, the expected value is decreasing with ρ. Remember that E = PM − c.
Therefore, if PM remains constant the difference between PM and the expected price
offered would exceed c. From here, PM must be decreasing in ρ. 2
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Figure 6: change in EPO as func. of µ, ρ (2 sellers)
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